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INTRODUCTION 
On February 4, 2010, Shaun Donovan, the Secretary of the U.S. De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), announced HUD’s 
creation of the Office of Sustainable Housing and Communities (the “Of-
fice”).2  Given the rather depressing state of the U.S. housing market, the 
announcement was one bright spot on an otherwise dim horizon for U.S. 
housing policy.  The new Office is a program within HUD “designed to 
help build stronger, more sustainable communities by connecting housing 
to jobs, fostering local innovation and building a clean energy economy.”3  
Through the Office, HUD seeks “to tie the quality and location of housing 
to broader opportunities such as access to good jobs, quality schools and 
safe streets.”4  Congress funded the Office in the FY 2010 Consolidated 
Appropriations Act,5 and allocated $150 million to the Office for a Sustain-
able Communities Initiative (the “Initiative”).6 
 
 2. Press Release, Andrea Mead, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Secretary 
Donovan Announces New Office of Sustainable Housing and Communities (Feb. 4, 2010), 
available at http://portal.hud.gov:80/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advi 
sories/2010/HUDNo.10-028. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. FY 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034 
(2009). 
 6.  U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FACT SHEET ON HUD’S SUSTAINABLE COM-
MUNITIES REGIONAL PLANNING GRANT PROGRAM (2010) [hereinafter FACT SHEET], available 
at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=regionalNOFA.pdf. 
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Instead of a reactive attempt to correct U.S. housing policy’s failures,7 
the Initiative is HUD’s affirmative act “to stimulate more integrated and 
sophisticated regional planning to guide state, metropolitan, and local in-
vestments in land use, transportation and housing, as well as to challenge 
localities to undertake zoning and land use reforms.”8  The Initiative is one 
effort of the Obama Administration’s broader Interagency Partnership for 
Sustainable Communities (the “Partnership”).  The Partnership is a joint 
endeavor between HUD, the U.S. Department of Transportation, and the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, to foster interagency coordination 
and cooperation around interdependent challenges.9  The Partnership iden-
tified six livability principles that each agency member of the Partnership 
will incorporate into its programming.  The principles are to: (1) provide 
more transportation choices; (2) promote equitable, affordable housing; (3) 
enhance economic competitiveness; (4) support existing communities; (5) 
coordinate policies and leverage investments; and (6) value communities 
and neighborhoods.10  The Initiative is one HUD program designed to ad-
vance these livability principles. 
One hundred million dollars of the Initiative’s funding is for a competi-
tive Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant Program (the 
“Grant Program”).11  Through the competitive Grant Program, HUD pro-
 
 7. Rightfully, most of the other articles from this Colloquium focus on legal solutions 
to the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis and the current foreclosure crisis. See gen-
erally Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, Reforming Regulation in the Markets for 
Home Loans, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 681 (2011); David A. Dana, A Simple Approach to 
Preventing the Next Housing Crisis—Why We Need One, What One Would Look Like, and 
Why Dodd-Frank Isn’t It, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 721 (2011); Anna Gelpern, Financial Sta-
bility is a Volume Business: A Comment on the Legal Infrastructure of Ex Post Consumer 
Debtor Protections, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 767 (2011); Robin S. Golden, Building Policy 
Through Collaborative Deliberation: A Reflection on Using Lessons From Practice to In-
form Responses to the Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 733 (2011); 
Melissa B. Jacoby, The Legal Infrastructure of Ex Post Consumer Debtor Protections, 38 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 751 (2011).  Since legal scholars from this Colloquium and elsewhere 
are generating beneficial legal solutions to these problems, this Article instead analyzes the 
efficacy of affirmative attempts to devise long-range solutions to the problems of regional-
ism before those problems culminate in a crisis. 
 8. Sustainable Housing and Communities, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal/HUD/program_offices/sustainable_housing_commu
nities (last visited Mar. 8, 2011). 
 9. See FACT SHEET, supra note 6. 
 10. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FR-5396-N-03, NOTICE OF FUNDING AVAILA-
BILITY (NOFA) FOR HUD’S FISCAL YEAR 2010 SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES REGIONAL 
PLANNING GRANT PROGRAM 3-4 (2010) [hereinafter NOTICE OF FUNDING AVAILABILITY], 
available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/grants/nofa10/scrpgsec.pdf. 
 11. See id. at 5.  Ninety-eight million dollars of the one hundred million dollar total is 
available for competitive grants.  The remaining two million is reserved for capacity support 
grants. 
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vides financial incentives to metropolitan and rural grant applicants to 
create regional plans “that integrate housing, land use, economic and work-
force development, transportation, and infrastructure investments.”12  The 
Grant Program places a priority on funding projects that “translate the liva-
bility principles” into long-term strategies to address issues of regional sig-
nificance.13  The Grant Program’s unique targeting of regions as sites for 
regulatory reform, as well as its multijurisdictional and multisectoral em-
phasis, make it an example of what scholars and policymakers call “New 
Regionalism.”14 
New regionalism has been defined as “any attempt to develop regional 
governance structures or interlocal cooperative agreements that better dis-
tribute regional benefits and burdens.”15  New regionalist approaches rec-
ognize regions as key sites for the resolution of contemporary, interrelated 
problems that transcend local government and state boundaries.  New re-
gionalism includes collaborative efforts between cities and outlying sub-
urbs to resolve metropolitan challenges such as affordable housing crea-
tion, transportation, sprawl, water access, infrastructure development, or 
environmental regulation.16  The new regionalist agenda supports norma-
tive goals similar to the objectives that local government law seeks to ad-
vance, including: (1) equity and inclusion within, and amongst, self-defined 
territorial communities; (2) democratic participation; and (3) efficient and 
 
 12. Id. at 1. 
 13. Id. at 3. 
 14. See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored 
Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2028 (2000) (de-
fining the term “new regionalism”); Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, Met-
ropolitan Equity and the New Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93, 100-19 (2003); David D. 
Troutt, Katrina’s Window: Localism, Resegregation, and Equitable Regionalism, 55 BUFF. 
L. REV. 1109 (2008) (calling new regionalist attempts at metropolitan-wide governance and 
land use “equitable regionalism”); see also ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOL-
ITAN AMERICA 170-82 (1994) (describing new approaches to resolving regional challenges); 
MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND STABILITY 
12-13 (1997) (describing Minnesota’s experience with voluntary regional collaboration); 
NEAL R. PEIRCE ET AL., CITISTATES:  HOW URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER IN A COMPETITIVE 
WORLD 34 (1993) (describing the benefits of new attempts at regionalism); DAVID RUSK, 
CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 85-130 (1993) [hereinafter RUSK, CITES/SUBURBS] (describing 
new strategies for addressing regional problems); DAVID RUSK, INSIDE/OUTSIDE GAME: 
WINNING STRATEGIES FOR URBAN AMERICA 153-335 (1999) [hereinafter RUSK, IN-
SIDE/OUTSIDE GAME] (describing multiple examples of new regionalism). 
 15. Cashin, supra note 14 (using interlocal as a term of art to describe agreements be-
tween localities). 
 16. See Troutt, supra note 14. 
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accountable government.17  Yet, new regionalists accept that new regulato-
ry formulations and institutional collaborations are necessary to advance 
their objectives under contemporary conditions.  New regionalism embrac-
es a broad range of institutional arrangements and regulatory formations 
that privilege the well-being of the region as a whole, rather than the best 
interests of any one locality within a region.18  New regionalism is a law 
reform strategy that responds to local government law’s failure to: (1) re-
solve cross-border, multi-issue challenges; (2) promote regional equity 
amongst interdependent localities; and (3) foster participation and collabo-
ration across local boundaries. 
This Article examines the Obama Administration’s Sustainable Com-
munities Regional Planning Grant Program as an example of new regional-
ism.  The Grant Program is not an example of formal regional governance 
or mandated regulation.  It provides federal economic incentives to encour-
age multiple jurisdictions to collaborate and to devise solutions to long-
standing regional problems.  The Grant Program, thus, signals a new era of 
federal/regional governance relations that is reminiscent of the Great Socie-
ty programs of the 1960s.  Yet, the Grant Program differs from those prior 
efforts in that its institutional design reflects newer approaches to gover-
nance and regulatory reform.  Specifically, the Grant Program’s efforts to 
incentivize voluntary forms of participation and collaboration between 
multijurisdictional stakeholders, devolve planning functions to regional, 
public/private partnerships that include traditionally marginalized groups, 
and monitor outcomes to ascertain best practices, make it an example of 
what many scholars have called, “new governance” or “democratic expe-
rimentalism.”19 
 
 17. See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan 
Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1124 (1996) (discussing some of the normative goals of local 
government law). 
 18. See Cashin, supra note 14, at 2027-28 (describing various categories and types of 
new regionalist governance); see also Troutt, supra note 14 (referring to new regionalism as 
equitable regionalism and describing and explaining that equitable regionalism “recognizes 
that issues with distinct equity implications should be susceptible to regional cooperation 
because they are typically the subject of localist opposition”). 
 19. See, e.g., Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law 
and Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND US 2 (Gráinne de 
Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006) (describing new governance as “a range of processes and 
practices that have a normative dimension but do not operate primarily or at all through the 
formal mechanism of traditional command and control type regulation”); Michael C. Dorf & 
Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 
(1998) (describing democratic experimentalism as decentralized governance which enables 
citizens and other groups to utilize their local knowledge to devise local solutions to their 
problems while regional or national coordinating bodies encourage such actors to share their 
knowledge with each other); Cristie Ford, New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: 
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Though the term “new governance” defies precise definition, scholars 
generally agree that the emphasis on governance signals “a shift away from 
the monopoly of traditional politico-legal institutions, and implies either 
the involvement of actors other than classically governmental actors, or in-
deed the absence of any traditional framework of government.”20  New go-
vernance also connotes a retreat from formal regulation; whereby bureau-
cratic elites impose rigid mandates in a top-down manner on the 
governed.21  Instead, governmental entities merely identify broad goals and 
structure economic incentives to encourage collaborators to pursue those 
goals.  New governance strategies also privilege the participation of non-
traditional, or even marginalized, stakeholders in public problem-solving.22 
Proponents of new governance assert that despite the absence of formal 
rules, mandates, and government control, all relevant public and private 
stakeholders in a given problem-solving network will often cooperate, ir-
respective of their power or status, to resolve public problems in a socially 
optimal and equitable manner.23  They argue that informal public/private 
partnerships containing multiple stakeholders may be preferable to bureau-
cratic agencies when resolving complex public problems.  Strict rules, reg-
ulations, and mandates are viewed as unnecessary to ensure regulatory ac-
countability, if the gravity, enormity, urgency, and uncertainty of the public 
problem facing the stakeholder network make collaboration and coopera-
 
Lessons from Financial Regulation, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 441; Jody Freeman, Collaborative 
Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997); Katherine R. Kruse, 
Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin’s New Governance Experiment, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 
645; Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 343 (2004); Lester M. Salamon, The New 
Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611 
(2001); Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Rethinking the Judicial Role in 
New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565 (2007); Louise Trubek, New Governance and 
Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 137, 145 (2006); Michael Wilkin-
son, Three Conceptions of Law: Towards a Jurisprudence of Democratic Experimentalism, 
2010 WIS. L. REV. 673. 
 20. de Búrca & Scott, supra note 19 (a compilation of scholarly articles on new gover-
nance in the U.S. and the E.U.). 
 21. See Lobel, supra note 19. 
 22. See, e.g., Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance: Lessons 
From Chicago’s Public Housing Reform Experiment, 116 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 
117 (2009). 
 23. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 19, at 22 (describing collaborative governance as in-
cluding the participation of parties who are interdependent and accountable to each other as 
as well as involved at all stages of the deliberative process); Trubek, supra note 19, at 141 
(describing collaborative health care collaborations including multiple types of stakehold-
ers); Orly Lobel, Rethinking Traditional Alignments: Privatization and Participatory Citi-
zenship, in PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, GLOBALIZATION AND MARKETS: RETHINKING IDEOLO-
GY AND STRATEGY 1, 5 (Clare Dalton ed., 2007) (describing successful public/private 
collaborations in a variety of fields). 
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tion necessary for resolution of the challenge.  Further, the informal nature 
of new governance’s collaborative networks allows stakeholder collabora-
tions to identify provisional goals, and then change those goals in response 
to new information.24  New governance practice also places lawyers in less 
confrontational and more collaborative roles.25 
New governance supporters assert that such approaches enhance the le-
gitimacy, accountability, and transparency of regulatory reform as well as 
increase its experimental and democratic nature.26  Most importantly, new 
governance scholars and advocates claim that such approaches to regulato-
ry reform, if properly implemented, will often lead to more equitable distri-
butive outcomes.27  While many scholars maintain that new governance 
approaches provide many reasons for optimism, several others have shown 
that such approaches can present substantial pitfalls for traditionally margi-
nalized stakeholders pursing distributive justice through regulatory 
reform.28  This Article examines both the promise and perils of the Sustain-
able Communities Regional Planning Grant Program as an example of new 
regionalism as new governance.  Part I outlines new regionalism’s response 
to the failures of local government law.  Part II explains how new regional-
ism is in fact a form of new governance practice, and thus reflects the 
promise and perils of new governance approaches.  Part III examines the 
regulatory architecture of the Sustainable Communities Regional Planning 
Grant Program and outlines the Grant Program’s potential strengths.  Part 
IV analyzes the Grant Program’s potential weaknesses for advancing dis-
tributive justice in regional reform using the case of the Madison, Wiscon-
 
 24. See Kruse, supra note 19, at 677. 
 25. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties Within Twen-
ty-First Century New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245 (2009); Susan Sturm, Law-
yers and the Practice of Workplace Equity, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 277; Louise G. Trubek, Pub-
lic Interest Lawyers and New Governance Advocating for Health Care, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 
573. 
 26. Some of the seminal works in new governance theory and practice which make this 
assertion include: de Búrca & Scott, supra note 19; Dorf & Sabel, supra note 19; Freeman, 
supra note 19; Lobel, supra note 19; William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal 
Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes, in LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 503 (2008). 
 27. See Gráinne de Búrca, New Governance and Experimentalism: An Introduction, 
2010 WIS. L. REV. 227, 238 (explaining that an “empirical overview of the scholarly field 
might well suggest that most new governance scholars themselves subscribe to a theory of 
distributive justice and conceive of experimentalist governance as one way of realizing 
this”). 
 28. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 22; Wendy A. Bach, Governance, Accountability, 
and the New Poverty Agenda, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 239; Douglas NeJaime, When New Gover-
nance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 348-49 (2009); David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitu-
tion: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
541 (2008). 
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sin/Dane County regional area.  Finally, the Article concludes by outlining 
the implications of these observations for new regionalist and new gover-
nance practice. 
I.  NEW REGIONALISM’S RESPONSE TO THE FAILURES OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW 
A. Cross-Border, Multi-Issue Challenges 
As local government law scholars have demonstrated, the contemporary 
reality of increasing metropolitanization creates problems for traditional lo-
cal government law.29  The term metropolitanization describes the interre-
lationship between “urban cores and suburban peripheries.”30  Suburbani-
zation—the migration of people from cities to suburbs—is the defining 
trend in the recent history of U.S. metropolitanization.31  Increasing subur-
banization from the 1960s to the present has led to the creation of multiple 
incorporated local jurisdictions.32  Those multiple suburban municipalities 
were created because major metropolitan cities resisted annexing the grow-
ing suburbs, and because incorporation allowed localities to control their 
fiscal, taxing, and social powers to attract low cost, high-earning individu-
als and to exclude undesirables.33  While small, suburban municipalities 
proliferate, the U.S. population increasingly lives in large, sprawling, eco-
nomically interdependent, metropolitan areas—including cities and sub-
urbs—rather than the geographically distinct and isolated areas that an in-
corporated municipality traditionally connotes.34  Studies have shown that 
by the year 2000, “nearly one-third of Americans lived in the ten largest 
metropolitan areas.”35 
As a result of increasing metropolitanization, residents of a particular lo-
cality may conduct their activities outside of the locality in which they re-
 
 29. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1115-17 (“The governance of metropolitan areas is 
the central problem for local governance law today.”); see also Cashin, supra note 14, at 
1991-92. 
 30. BERNADETTE HANLON, JOHN RENNIE SHORT & THOMAS J. VICINO, CITIES AND SUB-
URBS: NEW METROPOLITAN REALITIES IN THE US 6 (2010). 
 31. See id. at 37. 
 32. See Cashin, supra note 14, at 1992. 
 33. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 17, at 1136; see also Cashin, supra note 14, at 1991-
93. 
 34. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1116. 
 35. HANLON, SHORT & VICINO, supra note 30, at 5.  The 2010 Census may reveal even 
more significant metropolitanization, yet this data has not been fully analyzed at the printing 
of this Article. 
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side, but within the broader metropolitan region.36  Cities and suburbs, 
within and across state lines, may be economically and socially interdepen-
dent.37  Under these conditions, local municipal actions inevitably have 
cross-border effects.38  The decisions of a particular locality to exclude or 
include certain land uses, or to provide public subsidies for housing con-
struction or economic development, will inevitably generate externalities or 
have spillover effects on neighboring localities.39  Additionally, the actions 
of one locality acting alone to resolve housing or economic development 
challenges may be inadequate to resolve the regional scope of the problem.  
Further, if most suburban localities within a metropolitan region exercise 
their own local zoning powers to exclude affordable housing, then the ag-
gregate effects of several localities’ actions may put severe burdens on the 
central city.40  Thus, the interdependence of localities within a particular 
region and the cross-border effects of their decisions suggest that regional, 
rather than local or state, regulation and cooperation may be necessary to 
resolve problems the effects of which transcend traditional local bounda-
ries.41 
Many public policy challenges are also substantively integrated.  For ex-
ample, improving the quality of life for low-income public housing resi-
dents cannot be achieved by reforming housing structures alone.42  If one 
locality seeks to reform public housing without examining the entire re-
gional job market, that locality’s action or inaction may affect neighboring 
localities within the region.  Public housing residents in improved housing, 
but without any meaningful access to local employment, may have signifi-
cant commutes to work or may need transportation to a neighboring locali-
ty within the region to find work.  Reformers must acknowledge the inter-
related, multi-issue character of metropolitan problems and devise 
 
 36. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1116-17. 
 37. See HANLON, SHORT & VICINO, supra note 30, at 3 (explaining that the northern 
counties of Virginia, a once “predominately rural . . . small town state,” have become part of 
the “metropolitan orbit of Washington DC” as incomers to the region working in DC have 
moved out to the Virginia suburbs). 
 38. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1133 (defining cross-border effects). 
 39. See id.; see also ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT: AN INTRODUC-
TION TO MARKET CONCEPTS IN LEGAL REASONING 117 (2004) (defining externalities and 
spillover effects as costs imposed on others external to a transaction because all the costs of 
the exchange cannot be fully internalized by the primary parties to the action). 
 40. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1134. 
 41. See Troutt, supra note 14, at 1172. 
 42. See Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, White House Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 
et al., to the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and Agencies, Developing Effective Place-Based Poli-
cies for the FY 2012 Budget 6 (June 21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-21.pdf (describing the federal govern-
ment’s efforts to coordinate public housing reform with educational and crime reforms). 
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coordinated solutions throughout a given region.  Thus, local government 
law’s tendency to encourage discrete, single-issue, regulatory responses 
prevents the regional resolution of substantively integrated problems. 
B. Equitable Regionalism 
Local government law structures often preclude the equitable resolution 
of regional problems.43  Equity, as used here, includes equal access to op-
portunity, the “fair and just inclusion”44 of all relevant stakeholders in a 
given reform project, and “distributive justice,” defined as an equitable dis-
tribution of the benefits and burdens of reform.  Supporters of new regio-
nalism assert that by normalizing the self-interested, local decisions of mu-
nicipalities, particularly suburban municipalities with exclusionary 
tendencies, the traditional structure of local government law exacerbates 
interlocal fiscal disparities and undermines regional equity and collabora-
tion.45  The local autonomy over land use and fiscal decisions that local 
government law affords municipalities was justified when localities were 
separated by significant unincorporated land, and before transportation and 
job patterns connected formerly distinct geographic areas.46  Yet, under 
contemporary conditions, restricting local autonomy to a broad range of 
small local governments with control over discrete, but economically and 
socially interdependent territories, leads to fragmented local land use deci-
sions, systemic exclusion, and distributional inequities.47 
Not surprisingly, these effects of local government law operate along ra-
cial as well as economic lines.48  Race is often the preeminent determinant 
of locational choice.49  Citizens may move to a particular suburban locality 
primarily because of the race of its residents, rather than its mere “mix of 
services and taxes.”50  Thus, municipalities acting in their economic self-
 
 43. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1115, 1140. 
 44. Angela Glover Blackwell, Equitable Development, in BUILDING HEALTHY COMMUN-
ITIES: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR ADVOCATES, LAWYERS AND 
POLICYMAKERS 179 (Roger A. Clay, Jr. & Susan R. Jones eds., 2009). 
 45. See Briffault, supra note 17; see also Cashin supra note 14, at 1988. 
 46. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1133. 
 47. See, e.g., id. at 1135-37; Cashin, supra note 14, at 1993. 
 48. Cashin, supra note 14, at 1993-94. 
 49. See Lee Ann Fennell, Exclusion’s Attraction: Land Use Controls in Tieboutian 
Perspective, in TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WAL-
LACE OATES 163 (William Fischel ed. 2006) (explaining that Tiebout’s hypothesis casts “cit-
izens as consumers who vote with their feet for particular metropolitan areas”); see also Ca-
shin, supra note 14, at 1994 (“[A]nd the recent empirical literature on locational choice 
suggests that race, as opposed to the mix of services and taxes a jurisdiction offers, is the 
strongest of the factors that influence locational decisions.” (alteration to the original)). 
 50. See Cashin, supra note 14, at 1193-94. 
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interest have incentives to use their zoning, land use, taxing, and develop-
ment powers to exclude undesirables, as determined primarily by an inter-
secting mix of racial and class factors.  Local government law, therefore, 
normalizes and entrenches citizens’ private, market-based, racial, and eco-
nomic preferences, which exacerbates spatial and social inequity.51 
As Professor Sheryll Cashin demonstrated, these dynamics often lead to 
a “tyranny of the favored quarter.”52  Since most metropolitan regions in 
the United States consist of central cities, inner-ring suburbs, and outlying 
exurbs,53 localism has led to outer suburban rings that have rapid growth 
and obtain a disproportionate share of metropolitan public investments, 
such as new roads, highways, transportation systems, developmental infra-
structure, and water sewer services.54  The favored quarter reaps the bene-
fits of development, but externalizes development’s costs and burdens.55  
The phenomenon of the favored quarter also contributes to the continued 
racialization of space and allocation of benefits along racial lines.  To the 
extent that the favored quarter is disproportionately white and a dispropor-
tionate allocation of subsidies to spur development are allocated to such 
quarters, the benefits and burdens of development are unevenly distributed 
throughout a region in a manner that maintains the existing order of white 
racial hierarchy. 
Additionally, while outer-ring, affluent, and disproportionately white 
suburbs and exurbs tend to comprise “the favored quarter,”56 the modern 
metropolis increasingly reflects other more complicated housing patterns 
and spatial relations that defy the traditional black/white divide between ci-
ties and suburbs.57  As scholars have noted, the new metropolitan reality 
also reflects interrelated geographic territories with “heterogeneous and se-
gregated communities, immigrant gateways, minority suburbs, middle-class 
America suburbs, Black-middle class suburbs,” and great disparities be-
 
 51. See id. 
 52. Id. at 2003. 
 53. The term “exurbs” describes “a region or settlement that lies outside of a city and 
usually beyond its suburbs and that often is inhabited chiefly by well-to-do families.” Ex-
urbs, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/exurb 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
 54. See Cashin, supra note 14, at 2003 (citing MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A RE-
GIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND STABILITY 2-8 (1997)). 
 55. See id. at 2004. 
 56. SHERYLL D. CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE 
UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 170 (2005) [hereinafter CASHIN, FAILURES]. 
 57. See HANLON, SHORT & VICINO, supra note 30, at 106; see also John A. Powell, Ref-
lection on the Past, Looking to the Future: The Fair Housing Act at 40, 41 IND. L. REV. 605, 
608-12 (2008). 
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tween rich and poor within each formation.58  In these more complex met-
ropolitan environments, localism may further exacerbate even more com-
plicated racial and socioeconomic fissures and inequities. 
C. Political Participation and Collaboration Across Local Boundaries 
Lastly, local government law’s narrow focus on discrete geographic 
communities engenders a kind of nativism amongst residents of localities 
that precludes the pursuit of cross-border political alliances or multi-racial, 
multi-ethnic, or socio-economic diversity.  As Professor Cashin also ex-
plains, localism tends to “institutionalize societal attitudes that, in turn, 
reinforce existing disparities of power, wealth and social access.”59  Thus, 
the existence of the favored quarter, and its racial and socioeconomic dy-
namics, appear to be the result of an otherwise race-neutral order.  The role 
of government policy and subsidies in structuring and reinforcing private 
market forces is obscured, and the existing hierarchical racial and economic 
order is viewed by citizens as “natural.”  Therefore, residents of the favored 
quarter approve of zoning board denials, low-density development, refe-
rendums, and other actions that maintain the existence of the favored quar-
ter, while remaining naïve about the structural racial character of their deci-
sions.  Residents may also fail to support local or state public policies or 
regulations that will more equitably redistribute resources throughout a re-
gion because of a failure to see how other more equitable possibilities are 
in the region’s collective self-interest. 
As Professor Briffault argues, local residents tend to be oblivious to in-
terlocal, economic interdependence.60  Yet, localities within a large metro-
politan area “tend to rise and fall together.”61  Studies have shown “a high 
correlation between city and suburban growth in employment, income, and 
population.”62  The health of central cities tends to influence citizens’ per-
ceptions of the region as a whole and somewhat determines the region’s 
ability to attract jobs, tourists, and other drivers of economic growth.63  The 
interdependence of localities throughout a region exists beyond the central 
city/suburb relationship.  Compact suburban commercial sites, often known 
as “edge cities,” also recruit workers from throughout the region.64  To the 
 
 58. HANLON, SHORT & VICINO, supra note 30, at 106. 
 59. Cashin, supra note 14, at 2026. 
 60. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1149. 
 61. Id. at 1139. 
 62. Id. at 1138 (quoting Richard Voith, City & Suburban Growth: Substitutes or Com-
plements?, FED. RES. BANK PHILA. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 21, 29). 
 63. Id. at 1139. 
 64. Id. at 1140. 
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extent that some localities within a region suffer from high crime, poor 
educational systems, and the like, those dynamics in such localities may al-
so affect neighboring and affluent localities within the region.65 
The existence of multiple local boundaries within a region can also un-
dermine regional collective action and coalition-building amongst members 
of traditionally disadvantaged groups.  Scholars in the field of housing and 
community development law note the “limitations of localism”66 in creat-
ing multi-racial, multi-ethnic, socio-economically diverse coalitions with 
common interests.67  They urge advocates and community members in 
search of distributive justice to “look beyond community boundaries to a 
more comprehensive antipoverty approach that acknowledges the signific-
ance of regional and transnational networks in the process of economic 
reform.”68 
The aforementioned shortcomings of local government law illustrate 
that, given the new metropolitan realities, traditional, local government 
law’s unfettered local autonomy and focus on small geographic territories 
thwarts the actual realization of equity, community, participation, and col-
lective action within the region.  These are the normative values that local 
government law is designed to advance.69  Yet, local government law, in 
practice, operates to undermine those values under contemporary condi-
tions.  New regionalism attempts to respond to such limitations of local 
government law by offering new territorial, regulatory, and political 
frameworks to resolve intractable public problems. 
II.  “NEW REGIONALISM” AS “NEW GOVERNANCE” 
A. The Retreat From Regional Governments 
Notably, most proponents of new regionalism do not call for the creation 
of formal, general purpose regional governments to resolve regional prob-
lems.  Their resistance stems from the history of unsuccessful attempts to 
create general purpose regional governments.70  While the concept of “re-
gional governments” in the United States dates back to the nineteenth cen-
 
 65. See id. 
 66. Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: 
Toward a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399, 456 (2001). 
 67. See id. at 399. 
 68. Id. at 456. 
 69. See Cashin, supra note 14, at 1998. 
 70. See id. at 1989 n.11 (citing JOHN J. HARRIGAN, POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE METROPO-
LIS 342-65 (1993)). 
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tury,71 the rise of regional regulatory formations in the modern era stems 
from U.S. federal grants programs in the areas of housing, transit, and ur-
ban development in the 1960s and 1970s.72  The U.S. Federal-Aid Highway 
Act of 1962 required that urban areas form metropolitan bodies for trans-
portation planning as a condition of receiving federal funding for interstate 
highway construction.73  Specifically, the Housing and Urban Development 
Act of 1965 mandated the creation of organizations composed of public of-
ficials whom HUD found to be “representative of the various political ju-
risdictions within a metropolitan urban area.”74  This provision encouraged 
the creation of elected regional councils of government (“COGs”) and met-
ropolitan planning organizations (“MPOs”).75  These regional bodies were 
originally composed of publicly elected officials.76  Yet, in the 1980s, the 
Reagan Administration dismantled many of the federal programs that re-
quired metropolitan regional review and abandoned regional review re-
quirements as a condition of federal funding.77  Thus, the creation of for-
mally elected regional councils dwindled and the new MPOs that were 
created consisted largely of appointed or voluntary members.78  Such bo-
dies also lost their central planning and formal governance function.79  
While metropolitan transportation planning still occurs, such planning bo-
dies do not perform significant regional land use planning functions.80 
Additionally, court ordered attempts to mandate regional cooperation 
have also been largely unsuccessful.  In the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court 
began its retreat from the civil rights movement victories of the 1950s and 
1960s, sanctioning localities’ exclusionary zoning powers even though 
such actions had deleterious effects on regional equity and integration.81  
Further, in the few cases that did mandate, through consent decrees, re-
gional action as a remedy for past discrimination, local, predominately 
white residents staunchly resisted efforts to include formerly excluded pop-
 
 71. Briffault, supra note 17, at 1117. 
 72. See id. at 1148. 
 73. See Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, Pub. L. 87-866, 76 Stat. 1145; see also 
About MPOs: A Brief History, AMPO, http://www.ampo.org/content/index.php?pid=15 [he-
reinafter About MPOs] (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
 74. See About MPOs, supra note 73. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1148. 
 78. About MPOs, supra note 73. 
 79. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1148; see also About MPOs, supra note 73. 
 80. See Cashin, supra note 14, at 2029-30. 
 81. Troutt, supra note 14, at 1147-48. 
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ulations or redistribute resources throughout the region.82  Consequently, 
while some supporters of new regionalism still advocate for “regionally 
bounded governments to address matters of regional significance,”83 many 
new regionalists have reluctantly accepted “the political futility of seeking 
consolidated regional government.”84 
B. Regional Governance and Stakeholder Collaboration Dilemmas 
New regionalists support the creation of limited-purpose metropolitan 
governments, interlocal cooperative agreements, or other more informal 
and voluntary regional collaborations.85  New regionalism is, thus, a reform 
movement that is distinct from older efforts to foster general purpose re-
gional governments that supplant local authority.86  Instead, new regionalist 
approaches emphasize voluntary interlocal collaboration to resolve fiscal 
disparities and distributional inequities.87  New regionalism, then, is also a 
form of “new governance.”  Similar to new regionalism, the primary nor-
mative goals of new governance are to: (1) develop regulatory arrange-
ments to facilitate democratic participation and experimentalism;88 (2) 
promote efficiency,89 problem-solving, and accountability90 in regulatory 
reform; and (3) enhance distributive justice.  Yet, a growing number of 
scholars express skepticism and concern about the ability of new gover-
nance methods to fulfill these goals, particularly when traditionally margi-
nalized stakeholders are in collaboration with more economically and so-
cially empowered groups.91 
In my Article, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance: Lessons 
From Chicago’s Public Housing Reform Experiment, I outline three com-
mon power dilemmas that often affect the participation of marginalized 
stakeholders in informal, public/private urban reform collaborations.92  
 
 82. See id.; see also ALEXANDER POLIKOFF, WAITING FOR GAUTREAUX: A STORY OF  SE-
GREGATION HOUSING AND THE BLACK GHETTO 161-62 (2006). 
 83. Briffault, supra note 17, at 1115. 
 84. Cashin, supra note 14, at 2027. 
 85. See, e.g., Cashin, supra note 14, at 2028; Troutt, supra note 14, at 1173. 
 86. See Cashin, supra note 14, at 2027 ("The New Regionalist agenda accepts the politi-
cal futility of seeking consolidated regional government.  Instead, it attempts to bridge met-
ropolitan social and fiscal inequities with regional governance structures . . . . ”); see also 
Note, Old Regionalism, New Regionalism, and Envision Utah: Making Regionalism Work, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2291, 2292 (2005). 
 87. Cashin, supra note 14, at 2027; Note, supra note 86. 
 88. See generally Dorf & Sabel, supra note 19, at 267. 
 89. Lobel, supra note 19, at 344. 
 90. Freeman, supra note 19, at 22. 
 91. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 22; Bach, supra note 28; NeJaime, supra note 28. 
 92. See Alexander, supra note 22, at 135-42; see also NeJaime, supra note 28. 
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First is the problem of demographic representation.93  This occurs when it 
appears that the right stakeholder representative—an organization or an in-
dividual who will advocate for, and advance, the interests of traditionally 
marginalized stakeholders—has been identified because the representa-
tive’s racial, gender, or socio-economic characteristics are similar to those 
of the group that he, she, or it purports to represent.94  Despite this seeming 
alignment of demographic characteristics, however, such representatives 
may have competing allegiances to other groups because of multiple and 
rival identity characteristics (i.e., class over race, gender over class, socio-
economics over race, etc.).95  Thus, demographic representation does not 
always result in meaningful representative governance.  Rather, it can lead 
to false representation.  In such instances, organizations or individuals that 
appear to be representative of traditionally marginalized or disempowered 
stakeholders’ interests may be present in the collaborative network, but in 
practice they may actually intentionally further the interests of other, more 
empowered groups within the network because of competing allegiances.96 
Second is the related problem of representative opportunism.  Even 
when a well-meaning, demographically or ideologically aligned representa-
tive participates in new governance’s informal, public/private partnerships, 
motivated by both social and profit making goals, the representative may 
act opportunistically to pursue his or her own selfish ends.97  Both individ-
ual and organizational representatives can exhibit such opportunism.  Like 
individuals, organizations depend on their environment for power and sta-
tus as well as financial resources.98  Both organizations and individuals can 
be easily seduced by individual or organizational network participants with 
more money, power, or status.99  Such individuals and organizations may 
be dependent upon the private interests in a given network for financial 
support as well as positive social reputation or social capital.100  These rep-
 
 93. See Alexander, supra note 22, at 137-39. 
 94. See id. at 138. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. at 157-58. 
 97. See id. at 139-41. 
 98. JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF PRIVATIZATION 
AND EMPOWERMENT 20 (1996). 
 99. See id. at 20-21; see also Alexander, supra note 22, at 139-41. 
 100. Social Capital theorists assert that individuals’ and organizations’ “social networks 
have value.” ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMER-
ICAN COMMUNITY 7 (2000).  Even non-profit or socially oriented organizations may depend 
upon the private interests in a given network for positive social capital that validates and 
legitimizes the organization to other network participants.  This social validation can also 
lead to increased financial resources or social opportunities. See HANDLER, supra note 98, at 
20-21. 
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resentatives may receive promises or enticements from network partici-
pants with more status, such as collaboration on future development 
projects, choice units in newly designed housing, and financial induce-
ments that lure the representatives to support positions that further the in-
terests of more dominant stakeholders within the collaborative network.101  
Such representatives may do so to further their own individual or organiza-
tional interests, rather than the long-term interests of their constituents.102  
In this instance, it is opportunism, rather than competing identity characte-
ristics, that can lead stakeholder representatives to betray the interests of 
the groups they purport to represent.103 
The third dilemma, representative acquiescence, “occurs when stake-
holder representatives unwittingly articulate their needs, and those of their 
constituents, in terms that reflect the dominant narratives of urban reform, 
rather than demand concessions that will lead to the long-term empower-
ment of their constituents.”104  When this dilemma occurs, the representa-
tive is not consciously acting opportunistically or in contravention of his or 
her constituent’s interests; rather, the representative is unwittingly consent-
ing to a framing of the problem that justifies outcomes contrary to the long-
term interests of the marginalized stakeholders.105  When this occurs there 
is no clear conflict between the marginalized stakeholder representatives 
and other more empowered stakeholders in the network.  Nor are there is-
sues important to traditionally marginalized stakeholders that are omitted or 
unexpressed.106  Rather, the marginalized stakeholder representative is in 
positive collaboration with more wealthy or empowered members of the 
network, and ultimately agrees to plans or projects which disempower his 
or her constituents.107 
Both organizational and individual representatives can acquiesce.  Or-
ganizations, both for-profits and non-profits, also gain legitimacy, power, 
status, and resources by “conforming to the dominant cultural belief sys-
tems in [their] environment.”108  Thus, organizations, through their manag-
ers and leaders, may agree to conceptualize problems and solutions in 
terms that affirm the more dominant organizations or individuals in the col-
laborative network.  Acquiescence can lead marginalized stakeholders and 
 
 101. See Alexander, supra note 22, at 162-63. 
 102. See id. at 141. 
 103. See id. at 162. 
 104. See id. at 138. 
 105. See id. at 141-42. 
 106. See id. at 136. 
 107. See id. at 138. 
 108. See HANDLER, supra note 98. 
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their representatives who are participating in the decision-making forums 
of urban reform to agree to inequitable distributive outcomes.  Acquies-
cence is a power dilemma because it precludes fair and reasoned delibera-
tion between the marginalized stakeholder representatives and other partic-
ipants in the deliberative network.  Fair and reasoned deliberation suggests 
a dynamic in which each stakeholder representative expresses their consti-
tuents’ needs, desires, goals, and solutions.  The deliberative network, then, 
considers the stated positions of each representative.  From the arguments 
proffered, the deliberative network then selects amongst the expressed op-
tions based upon the strength of each expressed argument and each solu-
tion’s ability to resolve multiple and often competing objectives. 
Instead, acquiescence represents a form of power whereby the more in-
fluential and assertive members of the deliberative stakeholder network, 
through narratives, ideology, and other psycho-social processes, cause the 
stakeholder representatives to accept positions or solutions that maximize 
the economic and social interests of the dominant members of the net-
work.109  Alternatives or contrary positions or solutions are never expressed 
or even considered by the problem-solving network because the margina-
lized stakeholder representatives have accepted a framing of the problem 
and its possible solutions that favors the more affluent and empowered 
members of the network.110  Thus, through acquiescence the dominant 
members of the network obtain the willing consent of the marginalized 
stakeholder representatives to plans and projects that may not be in their 
long-term interests.  Such representatives acquiesce either because they are 
not knowledgeable about alternative outcomes or because they unwittingly 
ascribe to narratives, ideologies, and frames that actually further ruling 
class interests. 
C. Stakeholder Collaboration and Power 
These common power dilemmas correspond to the three dimensions of 
power first explicated by Steven Lukes in his seminal work, Power: A Rad-
ical View.111  The first dimension is the overt and easily observed exercise 
of power—where one person overtakes the will of another.112  The second 
 
 109. See Alexander, supra note 22, at 138. 
 110. See id. 
 111. See STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 23 (2d ed. 2005); see also Alexander, 
supra note 22, at 135 (this analysis is based upon Steven Lukes’ analysis of the dimensions 
of power in his seminal work, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW, wherein Lukes argued that power 
has at least three dimensions and that understanding the most subtle and empirically difficult 
to prove dimension of power was necessary to understand how socially dominant groups 
can secure the willing participation of those they successfully dominate). 
 112. See LUKES, supra note 111. 
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is how power can operate to more subtly exclude and suppress certain indi-
viduals or reform goals from the decision-making agenda.113  Third, ac-
quiescence is the most pernicious and difficult to identify operation of 
power, when “the dominant subject begins through narratives, discourse 
and other ideological and psychological processes to determine the subor-
dinated object’s wants, needs and desires.”114 
Demographic representation operates at the first level of power.  The 
challenge is for traditionally marginalized stakeholders, or policymakers 
seeking to ensure that the interests of traditionally marginalized groups are 
represented in a reform effort, to identify a representative whose primary 
allegiance is to the marginalized stakeholders’ long-term interests.  The 
ideal representative is one “who will hold fast in the face of overt power 
conflicts.”115  In some instances, this may mean that a non-demographically 
aligned individual or organization may be a better representative.  “[T]he 
researcher who seeks to study power at this level must study the easily ob-
served behavior of stakeholder representatives throughout a [reform 
process].”116 
Representative opportunism operates at both the first and second levels 
of power.  Scholars studying this problem must observe both the explicit 
behavior of the organizational or individual stakeholder representative, but 
also make inferences about arguments, grievances, perspectives, and indi-
viduals that “fail to appear on the problem-solving agenda.”117  Such pers-
pectives may be omitted because the representatives pursuing their own 
selfish ends may seek to suppress such issues from the decision-making 
agenda in contravention of their constituents’ long-term interests.  A re-
searcher seeking to understand this second dimension must make infe-
rences about marginalized stakeholders and their representatives, rather 
than focus only on the easily observed behavior of the stakeholder repre-
sentative.118 
Finally, representative acquiesce operates at the third-dimension of pow-
er, which is also the dimension most difficult to measure empirically.  At 
this level, the researcher must attempt to understand how hegemonic ideol-
ogies may operate to lead representatives to support outcomes that are not 
in their constituents’ long-term interests.  Such inquiries are difficult to 
measure, since it requires attempting to understand positions that are not 
 
 113. See id. 
 114. Alexander, supra note 22, at 136. 
 115. Id. at 137. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 136. 
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expressed, as well as the relationship between internal subjective processes 
and public policy outcomes.  A researcher studying power at this level, at a 
minimum, must observe the narratives that such stakeholder representatives 
use to frame the reform challenge and must make inferences about whether 
or not that framing leads to outcomes that are in the long-term interests of 
marginalized stakeholders. 
The operation of the above-mentioned forms of power present chal-
lenges for the presumed collaborative nature of new governance’s volunta-
ry and informal public/private stakeholder reform networks.  As the profit-
motive increasingly dominates urban reform projects, and as complex met-
ropolitan dynamics increase possible social fissures along race, class, and 
other lines, these levels of power may operate in any given reform project 
to undermine positive collaboration between differently situated groups.119  
These power dilemmas may obscure unique forms of regulatory capture 
that deviate from the standard instances—whereby a state agency charged 
with advancing the public interest instead furthers commercial or powerful 
special interests that dominate the regulated industry.120  Instead, the inter-
ests of the dominant actors in the stakeholder network are furthered through 
the informal stakeholder representative’s behavior in the deliberative 
process, rather than by a dominated bureaucratic agency. 
New governance theory and practice’s retreat from elected governments, 
formal law, substantive and participatory rights, and confrontational la-
wyering may leave traditionally marginalized stakeholders without ade-
quate recourse to ensure that their needs and desires are heard, respected, 
and honored at the decision-making tables of urban reform.121  Thus, with-
out adequate accountability measures, new governance’s informal collabo-
rations may lend themselves to a kind of sham participation and collabora-
tion which precludes the most equitable resolution of regional problems.  
New governance scholars increasingly recognize these potential pitfalls.122  
One scholar asserts that in order to ensure that new governance experi-
ments achieve their stated goals of participation, collaboration, and distri-
butive reform, at least two preconditions are necessary.  There must be “[1] 
the broadest possible degree of stakeholder participation compatible with 
 
 119. See id.; Patience Crowder, “Ain’t No Sunshine”: Examining Informality and State 
Open Meetings Acts as the Anti-Public Norm in Inner-City Redevelopment Deal Making, 74 
TENN. L. REV. 623, 639 (2007). 
 120. Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Florrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and 
the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990) (defining regulato-
ry capture). 
 121. See Alexander, supra note 22, at 165. 
 122. See generally de Búrca, supra note 27. 
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effective decision-making, and [2] effective and informed monitoring.”123  
These preconditions are essential elements of the institutional design of any 
new governance reform project. 
Yet, even if the institutional design of a new governance reform effort 
satisfies these preconditions, it is not clear that such elements are sufficient 
to ensure that power dilemmas do not operate to undermine distributional 
equity in regional reform.  In the next section, this Article examines the 
promising aspects of the institutional design of the Sustainable Communi-
ties Regional Planning Grant Program that may mitigate the problematic 
operation of power in metropolitan reform collaborations.  The Article also 
analyzes the potential weaknesses of the Grant Program’s institutional de-
sign that may permit power dilemmas to undermine the collaborative prom-
ise of the Grant Programs’ regional collaborations. 
III.  THE SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES REGIONAL PLANNING GRANT 
PROGRAM’S PROMISE 
The Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant Program is an 
attempt by the Obama Administration to resurrect federal incentives to fa-
cilitate regional collaboration as a condition to receive federal funding.124  
Yet, other than the 1960’s housing and transportation programs mentioned 
previously, there is little precedent in our federalist system for this type of 
federal/regional regulatory cooperation.125  While the Grant Program is on-
ly one small federal government incentive program that devolves the reso-
lution of regional problems to voluntary, public/private collaborations, it 
provides an example of the promise and perils of new regionalism as new 
governance.  The Grant Program’s institutional design reflects HUD’s at-
tempt to embrace new regionalism as new governance in that it imposes 
few mandates or requirements on localities or metropolitan planning bo-
dies.  HUD also attempts, through the institutional design of the Grant Pro-
gram, to address some of the shortcomings of traditional local government 
law by facilitating regional cooperation and equity and resolving interre-
lated problems.  The Grant Program’s promising features, in this regard, 
 
 123. Id. at 235. 
 124. The Grant Program’s Advance Notice and Request for Comment acknowledges that 
“[w]hile the benefits of integrated regional planning are numerous, the incentives, institu-
tions, and funding for such efforts are not widely available.” See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & 
URBAN DEV., FR-5396-N-01, SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES PLANNING GRANT PROGRAM AD-
VANCE NOTICE & REQUEST FOR COMMENT 7 (2010) [hereinafter ADVANCE NOTICE AND RE-
QUEST FOR COMMENT], available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id= 
SH_GRANT_PLAN.pdf. 
 125. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1154 (describing the decline of federal/regional col-
laboration during the 1960s and 1970s). 
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include: (1) a commitment to broad multijurisdictional stakeholder partici-
pation, including the participation of traditionally marginalized stakehold-
ers, throughout the Grant Program process; (2) requirements for applicants 
to develop comprehensive solutions to interrelated problems; and (3) obli-
gations for applicants to conduct effective and informed monitoring of their 
progress throughout the grant planning process. 
A. Broad, Multijurisdictional, Stakeholder Participation 
In structuring the Grant Program, HUD resisted a completely top-down 
approach to regulation by requiring a high degree of stakeholder participa-
tion in both the creation of the Grant Program and throughout the process.  
At the outset, HUD specifically tried to gain significant input from multiple 
stakeholders about the Grant Program’s institutional design.  An Advance 
Notice and Request for Comment (the “Advance Notice”) was initiated 
shortly after the Grant Program was announced.126  The Advance Notice 
requested feedback from “[s]tate and local governments, regional bodies, 
community development entities, and a broad range of other stakeholders 
on how the Program should be structured.”127  Specifically, HUD sought 
feedback about several things, including the categories of regions that 
should be included in the Grant Program, the types of activities that should 
be allowed in each category, and common performance metrics for each 
proposed funding category.128  HUD created a “Wiki” to serve as a reposi-
tory for comments on the Grant Program’s design and make it easy for 
many different stakeholders to shape the goals of the Grant Program at its 
inception.129  HUD also conducted a series of outreach and listening ses-
sions, as well as webinars, to educate the broad public about the Grant Pro-
gram opportunity.130  These efforts were designed to increase the inclu-
siveness and transparency of the grant process.131 
After the Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA) was devised, HUD re-
tained its facilitative posture by imposing few requirements or mandates on 
applicants, and by allowing much of the planning and solutions to regional 
problems to come from the localities cooperating in a given region.  While 
HUD gave applicants substantial discretion in how to shape plans that 
would advance long-term sustainability in their regions, it did provide min-
imum preconditions for what counts as a “region.”  Further, while the NO-
 
 126. See ADVANCE NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR COMMENT, supra note 124, at 1. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. at 2. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See id. 
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FA did not require applications solely from governmental entities or gener-
al purpose regional governments, it did closely define what multijurisdic-
tional entities were eligible applicants for the Grant Program.132 
An eligible applicant is a “multijurisdictional and multi-sector partner-
ship consisting of a consortium of governmental entities and non-profit 
partners.”133  A consortium that represents a large metropolitan area with 
an existing MPO must include certain collaborators in the effort, such as: 
(1) the principal city or cities within the region; (2) any other general unit 
of government with the largest population in the region; (3) other localities 
or Tribes that ensure that the consortium represents no less than fifty per-
cent of the population within the region; (4) the existing MPO or regional 
planning agency, if any; and (5) a non-profit organization, foundation, or 
educational institution within the region that can “engage a diverse repre-
sentation of the general population” and has “the ability to work with the 
units of general local government.”134  The Grant Program also provides 
requirements for eligible applicants from “non-defined areas,” which in-
clude any area outside the boundaries of an existing Metropolitan Statistic-
al Area.135  Thus, the Grant Program does mandate what essential entities 
must be part of a consortium.  As such, a mandate for broad stakeholder 
participation is incorporated into the Grant Program’s design.  Beyond 
those minimum requirements, however, the Grant Program gives applicants 
substantial leeway in determining which entities should be part of the con-
sortium. 
A consortium will not be recognized unless it can produce a written 
Partnership Agreement or a Memorandum of Understanding that evidences 
a commitment between all the members of the consortium to work as a 
group.136  The Partnership Agreement or Memorandum of Understanding 
must be executed within one hundred twenty days after the effective start 
date of the agreement and it must be signed by all relevant members of the 
consortium.137  The consortium must identify a “lead applicant” to act in a 
representative capacity with HUD and to hold fiscal and administrative re-
sponsibility for the consortium.138  Consortiums that receive funding must 
also work in partnership with public housing authorities in the region, al-
 
 132. See NOTICE OF FUNDING AVAILABILITY, supra note 10, at 18-20. 
 133. Id. at 18. 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. at 19. 
 136. See id. at 20. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id. at 19. 
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though such entities need not be formal members of the consortium.139  The 
requirement of submitting the Memoranda of Understanding demonstrates 
that the Grant Program seeks to encourage voluntary, interlocal cooperative 
agreements, whereby the obligations between parties are outlined via con-
tract rather than via statutory regulation.  It is also an element designed to 
hold applicants accountable to their stated claims of collaboration and 
broad stakeholder participation. 
Finally, since the Grant Program is a competitive program, applicants 
are selected on the basis of the number of points in each rating factor that 
they receive.  “Only those applicants that meet the threshold review re-
quirements will be rated and ranked.”140  HUD ranks all eligible applicants 
that meet the threshold requirements.141  A total of 102 points can be 
awarded to an application.142  Award sizes are ultimately based on regional 
population size and geographic boundaries.143  Applicants are categorized 
as either “Large Metropolitan Regions; Medium Sized Regions; or Small-
Sized Regions, Rural Communities or Small Town Areas.”144  Within each 
geographic formulation, HUD determines a minimum and maximum grant 
amount.145  The points system helps HUD to determine the most eligible 
applicants within each category.  “The scoring criteria used to award the 
maximum eligible points [in each rating factor of the] NOFA are how fully 
and thoroughly the applicant answers each item listed in each rating fac-
tor.”146  All applicants who receive a certain threshold score in their 2010 
submission will qualify for preferred sustainability status, which also quali-
fies the applicant for “a broad spectrum of benefits” including capacity 
building resources and points in other funding competitions run by other 
agencies.147 
Much like the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), the New Mar-
kets Tax Credit (NMTC), and other federal tax credit or grant programs for 
housing and community development, HUD reveals its normative priorities 
and objectives for the Grant Program through the number of points it allo-
 
 139. See id. at 21. 
 140. Id. at 60. 
 141. See id.  
 142. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FR-5415-N-01, POLICY REQUIREMENTS & 
GENERAL SECTION TO HUD’S FY 2010 NOFAS FOR DISCRETIONARY PROGRAMS 61 [herei-
nafter POLICY REQUIREMENTS & GENERAL SECTION], available at http://www.hud.gov/ 
offices/adm/grants/nofa10/gensec.pdf. 
 143. NOTICE OF FUNDING AVAILABILITY, supra note 10, at 15-18. 
 144. Id. at 15. 
 145. See id. at 16-17. 
 146. Id. at 60. 
 147. Id. at 9. 
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cates to each rating factor.  Rating factors with a higher maximum number 
of points indicate that the regulatory goal at issue is a high priority for 
HUD.  In its Rating Factors, HUD demonstrates its commitment to the in-
clusion of marginalized stakeholders in both the planning and implementa-
tion of the regional plan, and as beneficiaries of the plan.148  HUD gives fif-
ty-five points to the “soundness of the approach” outlined in the plan.149  
Of those fifty-five points, seventeen points are awarded to how the consor-
tium structures the planning process to advance equity, inclusion, and sus-
tainability.150  Those are the most points awarded to a subcategory within 
the “soundness of the approach” rating factor.151  Thus, the Grant Pro-
gram’s institutional design demonstrates a commitment to incentivize and 
to maximize the participation of multiple stakeholders in the grant planning 
process, including traditionally marginalized or underserved stakeholders. 
B. Equitable and Comprehensive Solutions to Interrelated Problems 
While the NOFA includes very few threshold requirements or substan-
tive mandates,152 it does encourage applicants to develop a planning 
process, and a long-range plan that responds to some of local government 
law’s failures to facilitate comprehensive solutions to interrelated prob-
lems.  The NOFA encourages this in its definition of eligible activities.  El-
igible activities are defined as “tasks necessary to develop a comprehensive 
Regional Plan for Sustainable Development (RPSD), to align investments 
with this plan, to improve the management capability to implement the 
plan, and to develop relevant policy, planning and evaluation capacity.”153  
The NOFA lists, as an eligible activity, the development of a comprehen-
sive regional plan that integrates existing land use plans in a number of 
areas.154  The NOFA also encourages applicants to explain how they will 
adopt a housing plan that meets the need for affordable housing throughout 
the region,155 and “incorporate[s] equity and fair housing analysis into re-
gional planning.”156  Applicants are also encouraged to undertake regional 
transportation planning,157 water infrastructure planning,158 environmental 
 
 148. See id. at 38-59. 
 149. See id. at 44, 61. 
 150. See id. at 45-46. 
 151. See id. at 61. 
 152. See id. at 28-30. 
 153. See id. at 22. 
 154. See id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See id. 
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planning,159 economic development planning,160 and climate change impact 
assessments,161 among other activities.  This guidance for what constitutes 
an eligible activity directs applicants to consider the interrelated nature of 
regional problems when developing their applications. 
The definition of eligible activities in the NOFA, however, does not re-
quire applicants to undertake such activities; it simply encourages such ac-
tivities by providing examples in the definition.  The NOFA clarifies that 
“[a]pplicants are not limited to the activities described below and are not 
required to address all of the activities but shall address those necessary to 
develop a comprehensive RPSD as is appropriate to their local context.”162  
Thus, while the NOFA encourages applicants to develop plans to address 
multi-issue regional problems, it does not mandate certain activities or in-
clude them as threshold requirements to receive funding.  Lastly, the NO-
FA also incentivizes applicants to develop plans that address the interre-
lated nature of regional problems in their description of the needs that the 
regional plan will address.163  It awards more points to plans that recognize 
the interrelated nature of regional problems, such as housing, transporta-
tion, water management, environmental sustainability, economic develop-
ment, climate change, and plans that take affirmative steps to resolve such 
problems in a comprehensive way.164 
C. Effective and Informed Monitoring 
The institutional design of the Grant Program also includes mechanisms 
to ensure that applicants achieve their stated results.  HUD evaluates appli-
cants’ progress toward their stated goals throughout the process.165  The 
applicant is required to clearly identify its plan’s outcomes and benefits.166  
HUD identified eight outcomes that it requires all regions to incorporate 
into their plans as key to “achieving sustainability.”167  These outcomes re-
flect HUD’s efforts to design the Grant Program to respond to the limita-
tions of local government law in resolving region-wide problems.  For ex-
ample, two required outcomes include: (1) “the creation of regional 
transportation, housing, water, and air quality plans that are deeply aligned 
 
 159. See id. at 25. 
 160. See id. 
 161. See id. at 26. 
 162. Id. at 22. 
 163. See id. at 39-42. 
 164. Id. at 3. 
 165. Id. at 57. 
 166. See id. 
 167. Id. at 57-58. 
ALEXANDER_CHRISTENSEN 4/9/2011  8:15 PM 
2011] “NEW REGIONALIST” APPROACHES 655 
and tied to local comprehensive land use and capital investment plans”; and 
(2) “[r]educed social and economic disparities for the low-income, minority 
communities, and other disadvantaged populations within the target re-
gion.”168  Beyond the eight required outcomes, the Grant Program gives 
applicants substantial latitude to develop other outcomes and goals.169  The 
Grant Program also requires applicants to develop benchmarks that are 
measures of progress toward achieving the stated goals at six-month, 
twelve-month, and twenty-four-month intervals.170 
The Rating Factor Form that applicants must complete asks applicants to 
identify very specific goals as they relate to Rating Factor 5—Achieving 
Results and Program Evaluation.  On the form, the applicants must: (1) list 
a regional planning issue to be addressed; (2) identify a long-term outcome 
that will demonstrate progress toward addressing the planning issue to be 
resolved; (3) demonstrate the livability principle that the outcome will fur-
ther; (4) outline the particular stated HUD goal that the outcome addresses; 
(5) identify an applicable activity to advance the outcome, and state what 
progress they expect to make towards pursuing that activity at six, twelve, 
and twenty-four months; and finally, (6) identify a measure of progress that 
relates to the anticipated outcomes at each stage.  HUD also encourages all 
applicants who receive awards to utilize the HUD e-Logic Model to man-
age the data necessary to demonstrate progress in achieving the stated out-
comes.171  The logic model is a tool that allows HUD and the applicants to 
reconcile the stated goals of the plan with empirical data.172  A final 
workplan and the e-logic models are due sixty days after the effective date 
of the agreement.173  The short intervals in which applicants are required to 
report progress towards stated outcomes suggest that participation, equity, 
and accountability will be monitored frequently, helping to increase the po-
tential effectiveness of the Grant Program. 
The Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant Program is, 
therefore, a promising federal initiative designed to address some of the 
most complex challenges that preclude significant progress on sustainable 
housing reforms in the modern urban metropolis.  In order to advance re-
gional sustainability, HUD designed the Grant Program to help localities 
overcome deficiencies in local government laws.  The Grant Program at-
tempts to resolve the challenges of localism by allocating money to region-
 
 168. Id. at 58. 
 169. See id. at 57. 
 170. See id. 
 171. POLICY REQUIREMENTS & GENERAL SECTION, supra note 142, at 61-63. 
 172. Id. 
 173. NOTICE OF FUNDING AVAILABILITY, supra note 10, at 64. 
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al collaborations and requiring that multiple organizations and governmen-
tal bodies within a region devise a written collaboration agreement detail-
ing how collaboration will be facilitated.  This element of the Grant Pro-
gram is designed to facilitate planning, cooperation, and coordination 
between multijurisdictional governmental bodies and non-governmental 
groups. 
Housing reformers’ failure to see how housing law and policy is inexor-
ably tied to other important substantive questions such as job creation, edu-
cation, economic empowerment, environmental stewardship, and broader 
land use patterns has also been an Achilles heel.  The Grant Program re-
sponds to local government law’s failure to facilitate cooperation around 
interdependent challenges by awarding more points to plans that propose 
comprehensive solutions to substantively integrated problems.174  The ex-
clusion of low-income, traditionally marginalized, stakeholders in the plan-
ning and implementation of reform has also been a consistent critique of 
federal housing programs.  The Grant Program addresses this by encourag-
ing localities to include traditionally marginalized groups in the planning 
process.175  HUD’s commitment to make the resolution of such long-
standing problems a central aspect of the Grant Program’s institutional de-
sign is also a promising aspect of the program.  It is not clear, however, that 
the broad stakeholder participation, comprehensive solutions to interrelated 
problems, and monitoring that the Grant Program requires is sufficient to 
mitigate the complex operation of power in informal, regional, pub-
lic/private stakeholder collaborations.  Next, Part IV explores the possible 
perils that the Grant Program’s design may fail to address. 
IV.  THE SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES REGIONAL PLANNING GRANT 
PROGRAM’S PERILS 
Despite the positive aspects of the Grant Program, some possible perils 
still exist.  This section outlines possible threats to marginalized stakehold-
ers’ meaningful participation in regional reform.  Some aspects of the 
Grant Program’s institutional design may leave the Grant Program’s con-
sortium collaborations susceptible to the various power dilemmas men-
tioned above.  Demographic representation, representative opportunism, 
and representative acquiescence can result from: (1) the Grant Program’s 
failure to mandate the participation of certain constituents in the consor-
tium; (2) its encouragement of public/private partnerships and the leverag-
ing of funds; and (3) its requirement that consortium participants have ex-
 
 174. See id. at 46. 
 175. See id. at 27, 45. 
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tensive experience and capacity.  Lastly, this Part illustrates how the 
process of consortium development in Madison, Wisconsin, while general-
ly positive, may indicate that certain power dilemmas are at work that the 
Grant Program is not designed to address. 
Specifically, HUD encourages consortiums that include governmental 
agencies at different levels, non-profits, and other more informal pub-
lic/private collaborations.  Traditionally marginalized stakeholders and 
their representatives may find these collaborations to be politically and so-
cially treacherous terrain.  This Article does not intend to construe tradi-
tionally marginalized stakeholders or their representatives as incapable of 
self-advocacy, articulating or fighting for their interests, or collaborating 
with others in sophisticated urban reform efforts.  To the contrary, through-
out the history of housing and community development advocacy, several 
groups have been very effective in this regard.176  This Article, however, 
does contend that urban centers are increasingly areas of intense social con-
testation.  As globalization and metropolitanization increase the number of 
constituents who have a claim to, and a stake in, urban territory, low-
income people of color and other traditionally underserved groups have to 
assert their needs against the backdrop of increasingly complex social fis-
sures.  When decision-making and planning about the futures of regions is 
devolved to regional, intergovernmental, and public/private collaborations, 
the design of such collaborative networks is essential to ensuring that dis-
tributive equity is realized.  While the regional collaborations that the Grant 
Program encourages may provide important local context and experience, 
and help localities to understand their interdependence, there is also a risk 
that, absent sufficient mandates or public law protections, such voluntary 
and informal networks will operate to undermine important public and dis-
tributional values. 
A. Demographic Representation 
The Grant Program allocates points to applicants if they can demonstrate 
their consortium’s organizational capacity to fulfill the plan.177  This re-
quirement may incentivize the lead applicant to choose as partners individ-
ual or organizational representatives who are more professionalized, rather 
 
 176. See generally URBAN PROBLEMS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (Ronald F. Fergu-
son & William T. Dickens eds., 1999) (outlining the history of past urban development pro-
grams and the successes of community development groups and informal social organiza-
tions). 
 177. See NOTICE OF FUNDING AVAILABILITY, supra note 10, at 61-62. 
ALEXANDER_CHRISTENSEN 4/9/2011  8:15 PM 
658 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVIII 
than grassroots-oriented.178  These professionalized individuals or organi-
zations may appear or purport to represent marginalized stakeholders’ in-
terests because the representative organization or individual is from the 
same demographic background as the marginalized stakeholder group.  The 
stakeholder representatives, however, may not be as attentive to the con-
cerns of grassroots or politically-activist stakeholders, who may have legi-
timate ideas about how to advance equity within the region.  Thus, gras-
sroots groups, who may confront and challenge the more established stake-
stakeholders in the consortium, may be excluded from the consortium.  The 
Grant Program does not appear to provide recourse for stakeholders who 
attempted to join, but who were not selected as a part of the consortium.179  
Thus, HUD might consider allowing stakeholders who are not ultimately 
part of the consortium to file a social impact statement in which they can 
articulate why they were denied participation in the proposed plan, what 
their alternative visions are, or how they will be impacted by a plan pro-
posed by a consortium in their region.180 
Additionally, the localities that truly exacerbate inequity within a region 
may elect not to participate.  The Grant Program’s institutional design at-
tempts to combat this problem by incentivizing the regional consortium to 
get the participation and buy in of key localities and cities in the region.181  
Yet, to the extent that the favored quarters do not elect to participate, those 
localities whose local land use decisions most frequently undermine re-
gional equity may continue their practices, thereby impeding the progress 
of sustainable solutions.  While the deliberative process of collaborative 
 
 178. See Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering: Navigating the Political 
Economy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1999, 2017 n.59 (2007) (citing Randy 
Stoecker, The CDC Model of Urban Redevelopment: A Political Critique and an Alterna-
tive, 19 J. URB. AFF. 1 (1997)) (explaining that as community groups assume the role of de-
velopers and hire increasingly professional and technical staff they become alienated from 
the interests of local community groups). 
 179. In Madison, Wisconsin, representatives of the Southdale Neighborhood Association 
explained that despite their efforts to develop an ambitious plan to advance equity in a low-
income minority and white working class neighborhood, the lead applicant did not select 
them as a member of the consortium. See Telephone Interview with Paul Finch, Legal Con-
sultant to Michael Goldsby (Aug. 23, 2010). 
 180. This Article derives the concept of social impact statements from the definition of 
environmental impact statements under the National Environmental Policy Act.  Environ-
mental impact statements require proposed projects to disclose their environmental impacts, 
including “adverse effects” of the project.  Scholars have suggested that a social capital im-
pact statement might help identify the pro-social capital and negative social capital effects 
of a particular project. See THOMAS SANDER, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS AND 
THEIR LESSONS FOR SOCIAL CAPITAL ANALYSIS 4 (1999), available at http://www.hks. 
harvard.edu/saguaro/pdfs/sandereisandsklessons.pdf. 
 181. See NOTICE OF FUNDING AVAILABILITY, supra note 10, at 1-2, 45. 
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long-range regional planning may help localities and other stakeholders in 
the region to identify their collective regional interests, without strong 
state-level mandates that require localities to engage in regional land use 
reform, many of the most important localities may decline to participate.  
The favored quarter may resist participating or it may participate in a man-
ner that precludes the most equitable solutions over the long-term. 
B. Representative Opportunism 
The Grant Program also encourages applicants to substantially engage 
the private sector and business interests in the consortium.182  Economic 
competitiveness and distributive equity are both key stated goals of the 
Grant Program.  However, these goals are often in tension in any urban 
reform planning effort.  Involving private sector or business interests in the 
consortium does risk that the private for-profit business entities may come 
to dominate the reform agenda in a manner that does not benefit traditional-
ly marginalized groups.  While the rating factors criteria attempt to mitigate 
this problem, it is unclear how a marginalized group can articulate its con-
cerns with the consortium during the process.  This is particularly true if 
the lead agency is the group that does the reporting to HUD.  How can the 
consortium hold the lead agency accountable during the planning process?  
What if the lead agency provides data about the number of disadvantaged 
stakeholders who are participating in the planning process, but fails to arti-
culate the strategic battles at the micro decision-making level that such par-
ties lost?  Should a private right of action to halt the planning process exist, 
if tensions arise within a consortium?  Is the price of this constraint on the 
planning process too high?  Would it allow disgruntled groups to hijack an 
important plan, falsely, in the name of equity or inclusion?  Or would such 
a constraint further ensure that consortium participants are responding to 
traditionally marginalized constituents’ concerns throughout the bargaining 
process because it acts as a regulatory penalty default rule?183 
HUD also understandably places a high priority on how the consortium 
leverages HUD funds with other sources.184  While this requirement will 
produce cost savings and help to enhance the efficiency of the Grant Pro-
gram, it may be in tension with the requirement to include marginalized 
constituents and devise solutions which benefit such populations over the 
long-term.  An increase in a plan’s private financial resources may also in-
 
 182. See id. at 24-25. 
 183. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Pe-
nalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 967 (2003) (defining 
“regulatory penalty default” rules).  
 184. See NOTICE OF FUNDING AVAILABILITY, supra note 10, at 18. 
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crease the influence that private interests have over the design of the re-
gional plan.  Certain fundamental equity principles, resident ownership 
structures, or other considerations that should operate as constraints or fac-
tors in the planning process may be excluded as more private money is 
provided to finance the plan.  Consortium members may attempt to demon-
strate a commitment to helping marginalized constituents by stating the 
number of units of affordable housing proposed in the vicinity of transit 
hubs, for example.  They may, however, fail to consider co-housing or 
community land trust ownership structures which facilitate long-term 
community stewardship of resources, but sacrifice profitability and wealth 
building.  Thus, development structures which enhance gentrification may 
be privileged over development forms that actually promote long-term eq-
uity. 
C. Representative Acquiescence 
If the localities whose local land use decisions most undermine regional 
equity do elect to participate in the consortium, their participation may 
cause the consortium to reject those planning possibilities that really en-
hance the benefits of reform for the most marginalized stakeholders.  Mar-
ginalized stakeholder representatives may be present in the network or or-
ganizations that serve such constituencies may participate, but they may 
acquiesce in decisions that advance the interests of the more empowered 
localities in the region because of a failure to recognize alternative possibil-
ities.  To the extent that most participant organizations in the regional net-
work have similar professional goals and objectives, the organizations that 
represent traditionally marginalized stakeholders may assent to solutions 
which re-distribute resources, but do so in a less aggressive way because 
they accept the dominant stakeholders’ framing of regional challenges.  As 
such, the most aggressively equitable solutions may not be included in 
many reform plans.  If collectively, several regional applicants fail to sub-
mit plans to HUD that aggressively pursue distributive equity, HUD will 
likely still provide the money to whatever level of collaboration and coop-
eration is submitted. 
D. The Case of Madison, Wisconsin and Dane County 
The sections above analyze only the potential promise and perils of the 
Grant Program.  The Grant Program is too new for a significant empirical 
study of outcomes.  HUD only recently released the names of the Grant 
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Program’s Finalist Grantees.185  HUD awarded $98 million of federal fund-
ing to forty-five regional areas, reserving $2 million for capacity grants for 
selected grantees.186  The grantees will be engaged in their planning 
processes over the next three years.  The list of grantees and projects is im-
pressive and suggests that the Grant Program spurred and supported impor-
tant collaborations to resolve regional challenges.187  While the local con-
texts of these various regional collaborations differ significantly, an 
analysis of the formulation of one consortium in the Madison, Wisconsin 
and Dane County regional area suggests that the process of consortium cre-
ation itself may reveal certain power dynamics that the Grant Program’s 
institutional design will not uncover or address.  An analysis of the federal 
Grant Program’s success depends not only on analyzing quantitative out-
comes, but also on studying the micro-level decision-making of pub-
lic/private collaborations and the process by which problems are resolved.  
This Article proceeds to provide that type of micro-level analysis of the 
process of consortium creation in the Madison, Wisconsin and Dane Coun-
ty area. 
Recently, three regional collaborations in Wisconsin were awarded 
funds by the Grant Program.188  In the Madison, Wisconsin and Dane 
County regional area, the Capital Area Regional Planning Commission 
(CARPC) was awarded $1,997,500 to further develop a regional master 
plan titled, “Vision 2020 the Dane County Land Use and Transportation 
Plan” (the “Plan”).189  CARPC is the designated regional planning agency 
in the area under Wisconsin Statutes § 66.0309.190  The Plan was prepared 
 
 185. See Press Release, Brian Sullivan, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Awards 
Nearly $100 Million in New Grants to Promote Smarter and Sustainable Planning for Jobs 
and Economic Growth (Oct. 14, 2010), available at http://portal.hud.gov:80/hudportal/HUD 
?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2010/HUDNo.10-233 (last visited Jan. 6, 
2011). 
 186. Id. 
 187. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FY2010 SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES RE-
GIONAL PLANNING GRANT SUMMARIES, available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/docu 
ments/huddoc?id=OSHCFY10RegAppList.pdf. 
 188. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES REGIONAL 
PLANNING GRANT FINALISTS, available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc 
?id=SustanableFinalists.pdf. 
 189. Press Release, Laura J. Feldman, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Awards 
Nearly $3 Million to Promote Smarter and Sustainable Planning for Jobs and Economic 
Growth in Wisconsin (Oct. 14, 2010), available at http://danedocs.countyofdane.com/web 
docs/PDF/capd/2010_postings/Regional_Planning_GrantWisconsin_Release14Oct.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2011). 
 190. See CAPITAL AREA REG’L PLANNING COMM’N, CARPC REGIONAL PROFILE 1 (2010) 
[hereinafter CAPITAL AREA REG’L PLANNING COMM’N, PROFILE], available at http://dane 
docs.countyofdane.com/webdocs/PDF/capd/2010_postings/CARPC_Regional_Profile.pdf. 
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and adopted in 1997 by the predecessor agency to CARPC.191  Other re-
gional plans for the area were also adopted that address “specific functional 
areas and systems.”192  Together these plans constitute the Regional Master 
Plan and meet Wisconsin’s Comprehensive Planning Law Requirements.193  
CARPC, however, applied for funds because these “regional plans are ad-
visory and lack clear enforcement authority.”194  CARPC asserted that “the 
main avenue for ensuring local implementation is through building a colla-
borative alliance with local units of government, an approach that requires 
resources which are in generally short supply.”195  Thus, CARPC applied 
for funds to develop a collaborative local network of regional planning 
agencies and localities to coordinate long-range regional plans.196 
CARPC is the lead applicant for the consortium.  CARPC has thirty-
seven years of extensive experience in regional planning and community 
development.  Consequently, in keeping with the Grant Program’s re-
quirement, CARPC devised a consortium consisting of experienced key 
partner organizations, including the Madison Area Transportation Planning 
Board, the City of Madison, Dane County, and the City of Fitchburg, 
among other participants.197  CARPC’s consortium has outlined a positive, 
ambitious, and promising plan to enhance sustainability.  Notably, seven 
municipalities in the region chose not to participate in the regional planning 
consortium.198  CARPC intends to keep an “open invitation” to those lo-
calities and will devise a marketing plan to inform the municipalities of the 
positive outcomes of the plan.199 
The consortium demonstrated its commitment “to ensure that the pers-
pectives of diverse and traditionally underrepresented populations directly 
influence the development and implementation of the Regional Plan for 
Sustainable Development,”200 by including consortium partners that 
 
 191. See CAPITAL AREA REG’L PLANNING COMM’N, RATING FACTOR NARRATIVE: CAPITAL 
REGION SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES INITIATIVE 1 (2010) [hereinafter CAPITAL AREA REG’L 
PLANNING COMM’N, NARRATIVE], available at http://danedocs.countyofdane.com/webdocs/ 
PDF/capd/2010_postings/SCI_Grant/Capital%20Region%20WI%20Narrative.pdf. 
 192. See CAPITAL AREA REG’L PLANNING COMM’N, APPENDIX: CAPITAL REGION WISCON-
SIN SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES GRANT APPLICATION 1 (2010), available at http://dane 
docs.countyofdane.com/webdocs/PDF/capd/2010_postings/SCI_Grant/APPENDIX%20Cap
ital%20Region%20WI.pdf. 
 193. See id. 
 194. See id. 
 195. See id. 
 196. See id. at 1-2. 
 197. See CAPITAL AREA REG’L PLANNING COMM’N, NARRATIVE, supra note 191, at 1-3. 
 198. See id. at 18. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See id. at 19. 
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represent such populations.  CARPC has invited the Urban League of 
Greater Madison, the Latino Support Network, and United Way of Dane 
County to participate in the consortium as organizations that represent the 
perspectives of traditionally underserved groups.201  Additionally, CARPC 
intends to form a social equity committee within the consortium that will 
meet to strategize about how to advance regional equity in the plan.  Un-
doubtedly, the above mentioned groups have a strong and important track 
record in the Madison, WI/Dane County area for advancing the interests of 
traditionally marginalized groups.  The consortium’s effort to include them 
in the planning process suggests its sincere desire to include marginalized 
constituents and their representatives in the process. 
1. The Local Fresh Food Market 
The consortium also intends to demonstrate its commitment to sustaina-
bility through the creation of four “catalytic projects.”202  The catalytic 
projects include: (1) a Sustainability Commerce Center in the City of Madi-
son; (2) a Fresh Market Vegetable Packing House Feasibility Study, led by 
Dane County; (3) a Local Fresh Food Market in a Low-Income Food 
Desert,203 (Feasibility Study and Business Plan) led by Dane County; and 
(4) a 100% Stormwater Infiltration System for a High-Density Transit 
Oriented Development.204  The catalytic project of a Local Fresh Food 
Market in a Low-Income Food Desert is one of the plan elements designed 
to advance social equity and address the needs of low-income, traditionally 
underserved groups.205 
The food market catalytic project will be located near the Southdale 
Neighborhood.  CARPC describes the Southdale Neighborhood as consist-
ing of “underserved communities with low-incomes, high unemployment 
and a general lack of access to goods and services.”  The Southdale Neigh-
borhood is located in the Town of Madison, which is a small, local munici-
pality situated between the larger Cities of Madison and Fitchburg, both in 
the Dane County regional area.  Over time, the Town’s territory was gradu-
ally incorporated into the Cities of Madison and Fitchburg, and the remain-
 
 201. See id. at 18. 
 202. See id. at 14. 
 203. See MARI GALLAGHER, EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF FOOD DESERTS ON PUBLIC 
HEALTH IN CHICAGO 5 (2006), available at http://www.yaleruddcenter.org/resources/upload/ 
docs/what/policy/ChicagoFoodDesertReport.pdf (defining a food desert as a large geograph-
ic area with distant or no grocery stores). 
 204. See CAPITAL AREA REG’L PLANNING COMM’N, NARRATIVE, supra note 191, at 14. 
 205. See id. at 20. 
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ing territory is slated to be annexed into Fitchburg and Madison in 2022, 
rendering the Town of Madison extinct.206 
Redevelopment of the Southdale Neighborhood was a key objective of 
the Town of Madison’s 2001 Neighborhood Revitalization Plan, adopted 
by Dane County and approved by HUD.207  One key objective of the Town 
of Madison’s plan was the creation of a small grocery store within the 
neighborhood.208  CARPC describes the location of the proposed fresh food 
market as a “food desert,” in which residents lack access to fresh food, 
don’t have access to cars, and must rely on local convenience stores with 
expensive and unhealthy products.209  Through the Local Fresh Food Mar-
ket Project, CARPC will seek to “create partnerships that will form direct 
links between the region’s vital agricultural producers,” and low-income 
minority end users in need of better nutrition.210  The Grant Program’s re-
sources will be used to develop a business plan for the Local Fresh Food 
Market.  The business plan will include projections of operating revenues 
and expenses, pricing and sourcing opportunities for locally grown food, 
surveys of neighborhood residents, and focus groups to ascertain capacity 
and demand as part of financial due diligence.211  The total projected cost 
of these planning efforts is $75,000; the planning is estimated to take six to 
seven months.212 
The Local Fresh Food Market will be located in a site on the Novation 
Campus, adjacent to the Southdale Neighborhood.213  The Novation Cam-
pus is a Brownfield redevelopment project214 led by an experienced and es-
tablished area private developer, the Alexander Company.215  The private 
company is nationally renowned and has extensive experience in Brown-
 
 206. Madison (Town), Wisconsin, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madison_(to 
wn),_Wisconsin (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
 207. See CAPITAL AREA REG’L PLANNING COMM’N, NARRATIVE, supra note 191, at 17. 
 208. See id. 
 209. See id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. See id. 
 214. Brownfields are “abandoned, idled, or underused industrial and commercial sites 
where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental con-
tamination.” Amy L. Edwards, When Brown Meets Green: Integrating Sustainable Devel-
opment Principles Into Brownfield Redevelopment Projects, 18 WIDENER L.J. 859 n.1 
(2009). 
 215. See The Alexander Company, ALEXANDER CO., http://alexandercompany.com/ (fol-
low “Company” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (“Specializing in urban infill, new 
construction, [B]rownfield revitalization, and historic preservation, our developments give 
new life to historically significant buildings and urban neighborhoods.”). 
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field redevelopment, sustainable urban-infill projects, and historic preserva-
tion.216  The Novation Campus is Madison, Wisconsin’s largest commer-
cial, sustainable, urban-infill project, and is projected to provide over one 
million square feet of sustainable, commercial office space.217  It is located 
on a former industrial site.218  In addition to being a Brownfield site, the 
Novation Campus is located in a Tax Increment Financing District (TIF).219  
The TIF was specifically created to support the Novation Campus redeve-
lopment.  Previously, Wisconsin TIF law prohibited towns from creating 
TIF districts, but the Alexander Company lobbied the state to change the 
law to allow towns with border agreements to create TIFs.220  The law was 
changed and the Novation Campus received approximately three million 
dollars in projected tax increment financing for Brownfields remediation.  
It is also expected to apply for and receive an additional twelve million dol-
lars for the Novation Campus.221  Many argue that the Brownfields remedi-
ation needed to revitalize the site could not have occurred without the TIF 
financing.222 
Growing Power, Inc. is also a partner in the Local Fresh Food Market 
project.  Growing Power, Inc. is a nationally recognized non-profit organi-
zation and land trust, which seeks to advance equal access to healthy food 
for all communities through the creation of sustainable, community-based 
agricultural food systems.223  The organization is the brainchild of, and is 
run by, Will Allen, a MacArthur Genius grant recipient and nationally re-
nowned innovator, who works on urban agriculture and sustainable food 
systems in Milwaukee, Madison, Chicago, and other urban centers.224  Al-
len is an African-American resident of Milwaukee who has an unques-
tioned record of success and accountability to low-income minority com-
 
 216. See id. 
 217. See id. 
 218. See id. 
 219. A TIF is a debt structure authorized by state enabling legislation that takes the esti-
mated future increase in property taxes generated by proposed redevelopment activities and 
captures that future tax increment to finance the redevelopment activities. See Dina Schloss-
berg, Tax Increment Financing, in BUILDING HEALTHY COMMUNITIES: A GUIDE TO COMMU-
NITY DEVELOPMENT FOR ADVOCATES, LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 129-30 (Roger A. Clay, 
Jr. & Susan R. Jones eds., 2009). 
 220. Vikki Kratz, Losing the Farm, ISTHMUS (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.thedailypage. 
com/isthmus/article.php?article=24901. 
 221. Id. 
 222. See id. 
 223. See GROWING POWER, INC., http://growingpower.org/index.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 
2011). 
 224. See CAPITAL AREA REG’L PLANNING COMM’N, PROFILE, supra note 190, at 18. 
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munities.225  He has been selected by first lady Michelle Obama as a part-
ner in her efforts to combat childhood obesity.226 
In Madison, Will Allen is also involved in a grassroots effort with other 
progressive organizations, such as the Center for Resilient Cities, and busi-
nesses, such as Madison Gas and Electric, to create “a community center, a 
project-based middle school, a five-thousand-square-foot mixed-use devel-
opment with neighborhood-focused businesses such as a restaurant and cof-
fee shop, an MG&E Energy Services Center and several acres of intensive, 
year-round urban agriculture.”227  This school, and the other efforts, all 
center on job training for, and the creation of, high-road, green-collar 
jobs.228 
The final main partner in the Local Fresh Food Market project is Robert 
Pierce, a long-time African-American farmer and founder of the South 
Madison Farmer’s Market, who currently operates “a weekly farmers mar-
ket within the Novation Campus and is interested in establishing a year-
round market.”229  These project partners are undeniably qualified.  Will 
Allen and Robert Pierce, in particular, seem to be demographically and 
ideologically aligned with the interests of low-income, underserved popula-
tions in the Dane County area, and they have a good track record of out-
comes and accountability to low-income minority communities.230  Thus, it 
is logical that CARPC would select these partners for a project to further 
social equity goals. 
2. Struggle for the Soul of Southdale and Drumlin Farms 
Yet, despite this seeming alignment of interests, there have been a num-
ber of power struggles over the future of the Southdale Neighborhood.  Al-
though the Southdale Neighborhood has been described as having a “dis-
mal reputation” with low rates of homeownership and high crime, there are 
some positive aspects of the community, such as the Drumlin Farms area, 
“a rural five-acre farm that operated as a site for Community Supported 
 
 225. See Maggie Ginsberg-Schutz, Pay Dirt, MADISON MAG., Aug. 2010, at 1, available 
at http://www.madisonmagazine.com/Madison-Magazine/August-2010/Pay-Dirt/ (explain-
ing that Will Allen has been selected as one of Time Magazine’s Top 100 Most Influential 
People for his work on sustainable urban agriculture in low-income minority communities). 
 226. See Allen, Will, C-SPAN Biographical History, C-SPAN VIDEO LIBRARY, http:// 
www.c-spanarchives.org/willallen (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
 227. Ginsberg-Schutz, supra note 225. 
 228. Id. 
 229. CAPITAL AREA REG’L PLANNING COMM’N, PROFILE, supra note 190, at 18. 
 230. See SOUTH MADISON FARMER’S MARKET, http://southmadisonfarmersmarket.com/ 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2011). 
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Agriculture (CSA).”231  CSAs are a way for local farmers to market their 
produce to local consumers who buy shares of the farmers’ crops.232  The 
Drumlin Farms area also contained farmhouses and community gardens in 
which, at one time, more than thirty families rented plots.233  The Drumlin 
Farms territory will be annexed into the City of Fitchburg by 2022.234  Yet, 
the Drumlin Farms were conducted on rented, not owned land.235  In the 
late 1990s, some Drumlin supporters unsuccessfully tried to raise enough 
funds to purchase the property.236  In 2007, the Alexander Company pur-
chased Drumlin Farms as territory for the proposed Novation Campus.237  
As of 2009, the Alexander Company was “clearing the site” of existing 
housing and other structures because the Company deemed the existing 
structures to be in “very rough shape” and “cost-prohibitive” to refurbish or 
retain.238  One Southdale resident argued that “the people who have been 
advocating are being evicted from the farm.”239 
Some local residents assert that, thus far, the Alexander Company has 
bought extensive land in the Southdale Neighborhood, including the Drum-
lin Farms area, for its commercial Novation Campus.  Yet, there are few 
proposed community benefits for current local residents from the new de-
velopment.240  Original plans for the Novation Campus showed a parking 
lot and multistory building in the location of the community gardens of 
Drumlin Farms.241  Further, some residents argue that despite formal public 
meetings, they feel that “Alexander’s plans don’t include them” and that 
the Novation Campus project has moved forward with “little public in-
put.”242  Some residents contend that the Alexander Company has only giv-
en “lip service to inclusion.”243  Former Drumlin Farms and current South-
dale residents are also concerned that they will ultimately be victims, rather 
 
 231. Id. 
 232. See, e.g., Community Supported Agriculture, LOCAL HARVEST, http://www.local 
harvest.org/csa/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2011) (describing CSAs as popular way for consumers 
to by shares of local seasonal food directly from a farmer). 
 233. See Kratz, supra note 220. 
 234. See id. 
 235. See id. 
 236. See id. 
 237. See id. 
 238. See id. 
 239. See id. 
 240. See id.; see also Interview with Michael Goldsby, Consultant for Southdale Neigh-
borhood Ass’n, Madison, WI. (2010) [hereinafter Goldsby Interview]. 
 241. See Kratz, supra note 220. 
 242. See id. 
 243. See id. 
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than beneficiaries, of the new project.244  Some residents also remain skep-
tical of the Alexander Company’s promises that the Novation Campus will 
bring them new jobs and tax revenues.245 
In light of these concerns, residents of Drumlin Farms and the Southdale 
Neighborhood attempted to negotiate a community benefits agreement246 
with the Alexander Company to ensure that existing residents receive ac-
tual benefits from the redevelopment, such as affordable housing, job crea-
tion, and preserved community gardens, rather than promised, but not rea-
lized, benefits.247  Residents told the Dane County Zoning Commission 
(“Zoning Commission”) that they would provide support for the project if 
an agreement on community benefits could be reached.248  The Zoning 
Commission did not facilitate the creation of a community benefits agree-
ment, but in response to the residents’ request, the Zoning Commission 
added an “amendment to the zoning petition” that required the Alexander 
Company to take “a more active role in meeting with the neighborhood.”249  
However, the residents and developer did not create a formal contract 
promising community benefits.250  The Alexander Company maintains that 
the Novation Campus will create significant jobs for area residents,251 but 
the lack of a contract or formal agreement to enforce such promises may 
mean that such benefits do not actually accrue to existing residents. 
The Alexander Company did, however, respond to community concerns 
by sending representatives door-to-door to inform “residents about [the] 
upcoming construction.”252  Forced in part by the City of Fitchburg’s re-
quirement that development projects cannot commence without a neigh-
borhood plan, the Alexander Company did, in conjunction with the Town 
of Madison, help to create a neighborhood plan.253  Some argue that South-
dale and Drumlin Farms residents were not an integral part of the develop-
 
 244. See id. (explaining that low-income residents are being pushed out). 
 245. See id.; Goldsby Interview, supra note 240. 
 246. See Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements, in BUILDING HEALTHY COMMUN-
ITIES: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FOR ADVOCATES, LAWYERS AND POLICYMAK-
ERS 189-204 (Roger A. Clay, Jr. & Susan R. Jones eds., 2009) (defining "community bene-
fits agreements" as a “legally binding, private contract between a developer and community-
based organizations, under which the developer commits to providing specified community 
benefits through a proposed development project, and participating community groups agree 
to support the project in the governmental approval process”). 
 247. See Kratz, supra note 220. 
 248. See id. 
 249. See id. 
 250. See id. 
 251. See id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. See id. 
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ment of the Southdale Neighborhood Plan (the “Southdale Plan”), and that 
the Town of Madison allowed the Alexander Company undue influence by 
permitting the Company to hire its own consultant to produce the Neigh-
borhood Plan.254  Some residents stated, “Alexander was really in charge of 
the planning process,” and noted that “the original version of the plan left 
out affordable housing and transit.”255  While the Alexander Company did 
hold several public meetings with neighborhood residents in 2007 and 
2008, when the Fitchburg Plan Commission held a meeting to approve the 
Southdale Plan on December 2, 2008, eighty residents showed up mostly in 
support of retaining Drumlin as a farm.256  The Southdale Neighborhood 
Plan was ultimately approved by the Zoning Commission “with language 
urging that a community garden remain in Southdale” and recognizing that 
the Drumlin Farms was part of neighborhood resources.257  However, the 
Plan did not provide that the community gardens would remain at the 
Drumlin site, nor did it suggest a new location for the gardens.258 
3. The Southdale Springs Cooperative Housing Conceptual Plan 
Many residents argue, however, that given the significant investment of 
public dollars through TIF financing in the Novation Campus, the Novation 
Campus should contain more public benefits for existing residents.259  Giv-
en their concerns about the Novation Campus’s lack of community benefits 
for existing residents, some residents of the Drumlin Farms and Southdale 
Neighborhoods sought to develop an alternative plan for the Drumlin 
Farms site.260  The Southdale Neighborhood Association enlisted Construc-
tive Change Consulting LLC, a company owned by Michael Goldsby.  
Goldsby is a local African-American consultant and a member of the 
Drumlin Farm Cooperative, who provides consulting on TID and TIF struc-
tures as well as sustainable development.261  The Southdale Springs Coop-
erative Housing Conceptual Plan (the “Southdale Springs Plan”) is envi-
sioned on an 8.05 acre parcel located on the site of the former Drumlin 
Farms, which is now owned by the Alexander Company and is slated for 
redevelopment on the Novation Campus.  However, the Southdale Springs 
 
 254. See id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. See id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. See id. 
 259. See id.; Goldsby Interview, supra note 240. 
 260. See Kratz, supra note 220. 
 261. See Michael Goldsby, President at Constructive Change Consulting LLC, LINKEDIN, 
http://www.linkedin.com/pub/michael-goldsby/15/562/54 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
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Cooperative Housing Plan is an alternative plan for the site, which attempts 
to retain some of the positive sustainable and communal features of the 
original Drumlin Farms site and gives existing Southdale residents more 
control over the scope of the redevelopment. 
 
Figure 1.  The Southdale Springs Plan.262 
 
The Southdale Springs Plan would retain 1.05 acres of community or-
ganic gardens on the former Drumlin Farms site.263  It would also reserve 
1.62 acres of land on the site for cooperative farming facilities that would 
produce organic produce.264  On the same site, within walking distance of 
the cooperative farms and community gardens, the plan would include a 
restaurant that utilizes the organic produce from the farm.265  The restaurant 
would be located in a historic house on the site.266  The site would also con-
tain space for small businesses such as coffee houses and other retail.267  
The idea is that local residents who receive job-training in sustainable ur-
ban agriculture and entrepreneurship could staff the small businesses on the 
site.268  Most importantly, 2.7 acres of the Southdale Springs Plan would be 
 
 262. EDWARD KUHARSKI, SOUTHDALE SPRINGS COOPERATIVE HOUSING CONCEPTUAL 
PLANNING STUDY SCHEME A (2010) (on file with author). 
 263. See id. 
 264. See id. 
 265. See id. 
 266. See id. 
 267. See id. 
 268. See Goldsby Interview, supra note 240. 
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reserved for affordable housing that retains the affordability of the housing 
over the long-term.269  The housing structures include twenty-six units of 
affordable cooperative housing that would serve approximately forty-four 
residents, as well as some homeownership opportunities that would use a 
co-housing model, or some other form of long-term, affordable, communi-
ty-based housing, such as single family housing on a community land trust 
structure.270  The site would also reserve 2.5 acres for a neighborhood park 
and preserve as well as walking trails.271 
Michael Goldsby, as a consultant to the Southdale Neighborhood Asso-
ciation, attempted to have the Southdale Springs Plan incorporated into 
CARPC’s application to HUD for the Sustainable Communities Planning 
Grant Program.  Goldsby contends that the Southdale Springs Plan’s at-
tempt to integrate resident-owned and controlled, long-term, affordable 
housing with preservation of green space, cooperatively owned organic 
farming, community gardens, and sustainable small businesses makes the 
Southdale Springs Plan consistent with the social equity and sustainability 
goals of the Grant Program.272  Goldsby is also hopeful that the Southdale 
Springs Plan could dovetail with the efforts of Growing Power, Inc. and 
Will Allen to create a sustainable school and urban agricultural site.273  The 
Southdale Springs Plan site is also located near major highways and is near 
a possible site for the proposed high-speed rail system between Madison 
and Milwaukee, Wisconsin.274 
However, despite Goldsby’s efforts, CARPC and those developing the 
Madsion, Wisconsin/Dane County application to HUD’s Grant Program 
elected not to work with Goldsby to implement the Southdale Springs Plan.  
Admittedly, there are several legitimate reasons that CARPC could have 
elected not to work with Goldsby and the architects of the Southdale 
Springs Plan.  CARPC may have felt the Local Food Market Business Plan 
was easier to administer or more apt for the scope of the Grant Program, 
which is a three year planning grant.275  CARPC may have also had more 
 
 269. See KUHARSKI, supra note 263. 
 270. See id.; see also Goldsby Interview, supra note 240. 
 271. See KUHARSKI, supra note 263. 
 272. See Goldsby Interview, supra note 240. 
 273. See id. 
 274. As of the writing of this Article, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker has rejected the 
federal money granted to be used for the high-speed rail project linking Milwaukee, Wis-
consin to Madison, Wisconsin. See Jason Plautz, Obama Admin Threatens to Take Back 
Wis. Rail Money, N.Y. TIMES, Nov 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/11/09/ 
09greenwire-obama-admin-threatens-to-take-back-wis-rail-mo-87303.html. 
 275. See Telephone Interview with Paul Finch, Legal Consultant to Michael Goldsby 
(Aug. 23, 2010). 
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confidence in the collaboration that would implement and administer the 
Local Fresh Food Market idea because of their track record of experience 
and success.  CARPC may have also rendered the Southdale Springs Plan 
unrealistic because its organizers did not have site control and were in con-
flict with the Alexander Company which did have site control and paid 
large sums for the site.276  CARPC may also have had less confidence in 
the grassroots community group’s ability to effectuate their stated plans 
and steward the plan over the long-term.  Lastly, personality conflicts may 
have been one of the reasons that CARPC elected not to work with Golds-
by to implement the Southdale Springs Plan. 
Yet, it is significant that an idea that is completely consistent with the 
long-term social equity goals of the Grant Program did not receive funding 
and was excluded from the process of consortium creation in this case.  
While the Local Fresh Food Market will undeniably reap multiple benefits 
for the neighborhood, and perhaps even serve a broader group than the 
Southdale Springs Plan, the Local Fresh Food Market does not guarantee 
that the residents of Drumlin Farms or the Southdale neighborhood will re-
ceive affordable housing, jobs, or control over the long-term scope of de-
velopment in the area.  CARPC does have other aspects of its plan that are 
designed to advance these goals, but it is not clear that those benefits will 
accrue to the existing residents of Southdale as many residents of Southdale 
apparently hoped.  Further, many residents of Southdale claim that their 
elected representatives failed to adequately express their long-term needs in 
the process of neighborhood planning, or in their struggles to have greater, 
enforceable community benefits result from the Novation Campus redeve-
lopment project.277 
While it appears that CARPC has selected social equity partners that are 
demographically and ideologically aligned with low-income minority and 
underserved groups, it is not clear that those representatives will assert the 
distributive outcomes in the planning process that some Southdale residents 
hoped for.  This is not to suggest that the selected social equity or catalytic 
project partners will intentionally or even opportunistically undermine the 
interests of traditionally marginalized groups.  However, it seems likely 
that, in the instance of the struggle for the soul of Southdale, the representa-
tives of marginalized stakeholders’ interests selected by CARPC may ac-
cept a framing of the Novation Campus project as “in the long-term inter-
ests of Southdale residents,” even if the campus creation sets in motion 
 
 276. See Kratz, supra note 220. 
 277. See id. 
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processes of gentrification that ultimately displace, rather than empower, 
existing Southdale residents. 
CONCLUSION 
The Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant Program’s em-
brace of voluntary, regional public/private collaborations to advance re-
gional equity has potential promise and perils.  The present staff at HUD 
seems quite committed to working with regional collaborators to advance 
regional equity and mitigate possible risks.  As such, the Grant Program is 
very promising.  The case of Madison, Wisconsin can be characterized as 
one anecdote that may not be representative of the dynamics occurring 
across the country.  It could also be dismissed as “much ado about noth-
ing,”278 since the selected representatives of marginalized groups in 
CARPC’s plan seem well-qualified to advance equity for traditionally un-
derrepresented groups.  Yet, the narrative does reveal possible limitations 
in the Grant Program’s institutional design.  The most aggressive solutions 
to promote regional equity, or advance the interests of traditionally margi-
nalized groups, may be excluded, sublimated, or omitted in the process of 
consortium creation.  The most marginalized or grassroots groups may not 
have the capacity to be selected as consortium participants, yet they may 
have important perspectives on how to advance equity within the region. 
Further, the Grant Program does not contain mechanisms to gather the 
kind of qualitative data or information that HUD would need to understand 
whether or not power is operating to undermine regional equity or disem-
power marginalized constituents in the process of consortium creation.  It 
also remains unclear how marginalized groups who are selected to be part 
of the consortium effort might communicate their concerns about the plan-
ning process to HUD, since the lead applicant is the main point of contact 
for the Grant Program.  The Grant Program also does not contain an admin-
istrative process through which other consortium members can hold the 
lead applicant accountable, if they feel that their interests are not adequate-
ly respected in the regional planning process.  Thus, similar stories or pow-
er struggles could be occurring in the process of consortium development 
in other regions, but the Grant Program is not designed to capture those oc-
currences. 
Additionally, the Grant Program does not mandate the participation of 
certain traditionally underserved or marginalized groups, or their represent-
 
 278. See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING (Sheldon P. 
Zitner ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 1993) (infamous comedic play describing a situation in 
which a great fuss was made about matters that were in fact insignificant). 
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atives, in its threshold requirements for the Grant Program.  It incentivizes 
applicants to include such groups, but it does not require them to do so.  
Consequently, a program may contain equitable elements on paper, but fail 
to retain those elements over the long-haul implementation stage.  This is 
more likely if private interests are a substantial part of the plan.  The Grant 
Program’s focus on groups that have technical capacity and experience, and 
who can leverage funds, may mean that the most grassroots or politically 
active groups that represent traditionally underserved constituents may not 
be selected.  While the Grant Program provides technical assistance fund-
ing to its grantees, little financial technical assistance was provided to help 
more inexperienced groups prepare for the application process. 
These concerns outline only a few of the possible pitfalls for the Grant 
Program.  While the Grant Program is promising, its penchant for voluntary 
and contractual regional collaboration may cause it to suffer from the long-
standing criticisms of new governance in practice.  Perhaps more participa-
tory and outcome requirements; more mechanisms through which margina-
lized groups can express their concerns with the process of consortium 
formation or deliberation; more money for technical assistance, among oth-
er protections; can be incorporated into future voluntary, regional, problem-
solving programs.  Including protections of this kind may help the regional 
problem solving networks remain accountable to the public law values of 
equity and inclusion that continue to elude traditional local government law 
structures. 
